F-Root DNS server moved to Beijing
F-Root DNS server moved to Beijing Systems such as DNS (root) servers often rely on anycast technology to improve availability and response time. The idea behind anycast is that the same prefix is announced from multiple geographically separated systems. As a result the client should always end-up at the closest (as seen from a BGP perspective) server. Often these anycast nodes are deployed to only serve specific network and/or regional areas, making them only reachable from the networks where they are deployed. In the case of the F-root server, operated by ISC, there are quite a few local servers. See this page for a detailed list: https://www.isc.org/community/f-root/sites One of these servers is the F-root located in China. This weekend for about 25 hours this particular root server was reachable not only from China, but from several places in the world when using IPv6. Normally this shouldn’t be a real problem, as the root servers return the same DNS response regardless of their geographical location. However in the case of China, all traffic typically passes through the great firewall where DNS responses for requests such as facebook.com are often rewritten to different false IP addresses. Please note that I am not aware of any data to confirm if this is what happened in this particular case! Technical details This weekend between 01 Oct 2011 17:56:12 and 02 Oct 2011 19:01:09 GMT a number of providers thought that the best IPv6 path to the F-root server (AS3557), was to the F-root in China. The prefix for the F-root server is 2001:500:2f::/48 and is originated by the following AS numbers: 3557 ISC-F-ROOT Internet Systems Consortium, Inc 1280 ISC-AS1280 Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. 30132 ISC-AMS1 Internet Systems Consortium, Inc By looking at the next hop AS number we can get a good feeling of where the server for this particular announcement resides. When analyzing the announcement for 2001:500:2f::/48 we saw one new AS we had not seen before outside of China, AS55439. When looking at all announcements for the F-root in China, we saw the following constant in the ASpath: 6939 23911 18344 37944 24151 55439 3557 In this case AS55439 is the AS for ISC-PEK2 Internet Systems Consortium, (Beijing, China). Next the announcement was passed along to AS24151 (China Internet Network Information Center), AS37944 (CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NETWORK), AS18344 (CNCGROUP-BACKBONE-NORTH), it then ended up at the AS23911, the China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX. That’s where it was learned by AS6939 Hurricane Electric, the world’s largest IPv6 provider. Hurricane electric then advertised it to its customers. The dataset I used showed that numerous Hurricane electric customers in countries worldwide, including for example Germany, South Africa, Brazil and the US selected this path to China. Some of the large providers include AT&T, Telia and Interoute. What does all this mean It’s likely that DNS queries over IPv6 to the F-root server from clients worldwide were answered by the F-root in China. Although this is in itself is not necessarily a problem, it does expose this traffic to the Great Chinese Firewall with the risk of altering the responses. This is not the first time this happens, last year Renesys reported about a similar event involving the I-root server and China. The only way to make sure that DNS responses are not rewritten is to use DNSSEC, this will allow the resolver to verify the authenticity of the response. With regards to BGP, in this case all that seems to have happened was a BGP leak. Things like this are typically the result of an operator mistake. Best practice is to monitor for these kinds of things, so you’ll be alerted as soon as it happens and as a result allowing operators to limit the effect of such an event. BGPmon.net provides users with several flexible ways to monitor BGP announcement and to check if they match your BGP policies.